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Abstract
This article unravels China’s united front work in dealing with civil society, 
using the case of Hong Kong after the political handover since 1997. While 
it has been widely analyzed by scholars that state corporatism characterizes 
the state-society relations in China, including the state’s relations with its 
autonomous regions, Hong Kong as a special administrative region, however, 
shows that the ruling strategies of China are very adaptive. Comparing 
with the rest of China where the united front work is partly characterized 
by a heavy-handed policy of assimilation, the united front work in the 
post-handover Hong Kong illustrates a more inclusionary version of state 
corporatism through five types of measures, namely, integration, cooptation, 
collaboration, containment, and denunciation. The strategies range from 
soft to hard tactics, and are adopted depending upon whether the central 
government regards its targets as friends, valuable potential cooptees or 
enemies. Nevertheless, the soft and hard tactics used in parallel in Hong Kong 
have resulted in further politicization and polarization of the civil society, and 
transformed the tension between the state and the local groups into clashes 
between different local groups, as seen in other autonomous regions such as 
Tibet and Xinjiang. Over the years, the agents for state corporatism have been 
ever expanding in Hong Kong. The ideologies propagated have now gone 
beyond consensus and harmony to also include patriotism and reinterpre-
tation of other political ideas, including universal suffrage, conducive to 
cultivating obedience.
Keywords: state corporatism, united front, autonomous regions, special 
administrative regions, Hong Kong and China
JEL classification: H70, H73, H77, Z19
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1. Introduction
This article seeks to unravel China’s united front work in dealing with civil 
society, using the case of Hong Kong after the political handover since 
1997. While it has been widely analyzed by scholars that state corporatism 
characterizes the state-society relations in China, including the state’s relations 
with its autonomous regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, the 
case of Hong Kong as a special administrative region, however, shows that 
the ruling strategies of China, an authoritarian sovereign, are very adaptive. 
Comparing with the rest of China where the united front work is characterized 
by a parallel use of soft tactics and a heavy-handed policy of assimilation, 
the united front work in the post-handover Hong Kong illustrates a more 
inclusionary version of state corporatism. As such, the case of Hong Kong 
is also indicative of China’s adaptable ruling strategies towards its special 
administrative regions (which may perhaps in the future include Taiwan) 
and autonomous regions, as well as the future of their democratization. 
Overall speaking, the article investigates China’s direct and indirect influence 
in managing Hong Kong’s civil society through five types of corporatist 
measures, including integration, cooptation, collaboration, containment and 
denunciation, and their implications.  
2. China’s State Corporatism and United Front Work
Since the 1990s, the concept of state corporatism has been widely used by 
scholars in analyzing the ruling strategies of China. In practice, parts of such 
strategies are often referred to as the united front work by Beijing. The two 
terms are not mutually exclusive, nevertheless. While state corporatism indi-
cates China’s overall ruling framework, its united front work is the relatively 
informal and soft tactics adopted to build friendship and its following, which 
include the work to educate, persuade, coopt and integrate people.
Corporatism is a long-established theory in the study of politics and 
has different variants. Based on the different degrees of state centralization 
and organization of corporatist institutions subject to historical and cultural 
differences, corporatism can be distinguished into strong, intermediate and 
weak types, as well as political, societal or neo-corporatism (Foweraker, 1987; 
Wiarda, 1996). As a general classification suggested by Schmitter, political 
corporatism, also called state corporatism, is distinguished from societal 
corporatism or neo-corporatism. In the modern world, the former refers to an 
authoritarian and coercive form of corporatism, while the latter represents a 
democratic form of corporatism. In state corporatism, the state is strong and 
dominates over territorial and political subunits as well as interests groups, and 
bureaucrats are ideologically selected. In contrast, under societal corporatism 
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or neo-corporatism practised today mostly in developed industrial and social 
welfare oriented countries, social and interest groups are incorporated into 
the decision making machinery on social and economic policies in particular 
(Schmitter, 1974; Wiarda, 1996).
In dealing with civil society, state corporatism carries the following 
main features. Previous analyses, for example, Foweraker’s study of the 
Franco regime of Spain (1987) and Unger and Chan’s study of China (1995), 
found that the role of the state in state corporatism is directive, interventive 
and exclusive with the aim of maintaining its hegemony and achieving high 
degrees of political collaboration. 
Specifically, the directive role of the state on the society is evident in 
various aspects. At the ideological level, it is perceived as a state responsibility 
to define and promote national interests, and to impose such norms on the 
people. Though what national interests mean are rarely precisely defined in 
state corporatism, it is observed that these often include national integration, 
economic growth, stability, social harmony and consensus, and the dispelling 
of popular aspiration for democracy (Spalding, 1981; Foweraker, 1987). 
The hierarchical relationship of the state to the society also distinguishes 
it from the bottom up interest cooptation processes in liberal democracy and 
societal corporatism (Oi, 1992; Chan, 1993; Unger and Chan, 1995; Wiarda, 
1996; Unger, 2008). Under state corporatism, the state plays an important 
architectural role in the building of relatively cohesive and hierarchical 
bureaucratic institutions and structures facilitating control of different social 
sectors, interest groups and political parties (if any). It also acts as an active 
arbiter for various parochial interests organizing the relations among them. 
Often, elite associations are formed whereby specific associations are 
selected by the state and granted the monopoly of representation within a 
specific sector serving as surrogates of state interests. Through the process 
of interest incorporation, associations are incorporated into advisory or 
execution bodies with little real power as appendages to the state to assist in 
its governance. Associations that are not approved by the state will be kept 
peripheral in political influence or even barred. The internal governance of 
organizations is closely monitored by the state, and the associations are also 
demanded to exercise some control over their memberships. Elite associations 
may still enjoy relative autonomy from the state but their role in the decision 
making process is usually passive and minimal (Schmitter, 1974; Spalding, 
1981; Foweraker, 1987; Unger and Chan, 1995; Wiarda, 1996; Unger, 2008). 
Importantly, the state architecture of formal control of the society always 
coupled with the implementation of rigid laws containing and curbing 
political forces from threatening the state. Protests and demonstrations are 
prohibited or only nominally allowed. And the media is often state-run or 
heavily censored. 
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Other state corporatisms alike, the creeds of social stability and harmony 
are undeniably significant in the official discourse of the Chinese state, 
however, they do not stand alone. To strengthen its rule, China has actively 
promoted patriotism in the form of “China can say no” and rejection of 
foreign intervention. In addition, it has attempted to develop a set of standards 
different from the West, so that it would not be evaluated on the same ground 
as in liberal democracies. Series of attempts have been made to deny the 
relevance of certain Western concepts, notably human rights and democracy. 
Institutionally, China has remained a one-party state ruled under the 
Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) which executes control over all 
government organizations. Party committees are parallel at all levels to the 
government structure through which the Party exercises control over the 
policy process of the state. Inside the Party, the Politburo and its Standing 
Committee sit at the top of the power structure but are not accountable to any 
other institutions. The system of the government is one of people’s congresses, 
which hierarchically begins with the National People’s Congress (hereafter 
NPC) at the top, then followed by the provincial, municipal, and township 
people’s congresses, and so on. In theory, the NPC elects the President and 
Vice-President for the state, but in reality the candidates for the office are 
chosen by the Party. The Premier as the head of the government is formally 
appointed by the President with the approval of NPC, who in reality is also 
chosen by the Party. 
With regard to the society, the United Front Department of the Central 
Committee of the CCP is responsible for the united front work at this level. 
During former Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s reign, the united front was 
formed to carry out its work via various corporatist structures. Structures 
directly led by the state, such as street committees, neighbourhood committees, 
communes, danwei 单位, and other surrogate mass organizations including 
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Chinese New Democracy Youth 
League (now Communist Youth League of China), and All-China Women’s 
Federation, were introduced and incorporated into the party-state. The media 
was state-run following the government’s journalistic guidelines. 
A greater degree of liberalization has been witnessed in China since 
the economic reforms in the 1980s. Although only one single organization 
would be recognized by the state as the representative for each sector, 
gradual development in China has prompted the state to allow the formation 
of a variety of non-political social organizations, such as scholarly societies, 
charities, and professional associations. Such a growing liberal atmosphere 
was soon crushed during the 1989 protests in Beijing, and so was the demand 
for autonomous organizations for students and workers. 
Since 1989, China reinstituted a more comprehensive registration system 
for all social organizations. For instance, only one association was allowed to 
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register as the representative for each sector. Associations had to be registered 
and sponsored by a supervisory body. The state could carry out annual review 
of the associations and intervene into their internal governance (Unger, 2008). 
In the 1990s, a tripartite corporatist structure was established to deal with 
industrial relations, with the Labour Bureau as the representative of the state, 
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions as the representative of the workers, 
and the Chinese Enterprise Directors’ Association representing the employers. 
While the state is active in regulating the relations of organizations, especially 
those in the key sectors, to maintain its influence and to ensure that the state 
is in control, politically non-sensitive associations such as those for sports, 
arts and culture, environment, and retired teachers do enjoy greater autonomy 
(White, 1993). 
Some independent media outlets have emerged and the media has also 
become increasingly commercialized in China since the 1980s. Nevertheless, 
until today, the media continues to be closely monitored by government 
agencies, such as the Propaganda Department. Protesting has been a consti-
tutional right of Chinese citizens but advance permission from the Public 
Security Bureau has to be obtained for actual allowance.
Similar state-corporatist strategies are also witnessed in China’s auto-
nomous regions. Although the regions were promised a high degree of 
autonomy upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, 
measures of coercion, assimilation, persuasion and inducement have been 
implemented to strengthen state control. Over the past decades, massive 
economic development programs, such as the Great Western Development 
Plan, have been carried out to quicken the economic integration of the 
autonomous regions with the China proper and increase Han migration 
into the regions. Political-wise, minority ethnic groups in the autonomous 
regions are granted greater political representation in the NPC. Also, the 
Law on Regional Autonomy for the Minorities (1984) stipulates that the 
administrative head of the autonomous regions be a citizen of the respec-tive 
ethnic group. However, no comparable stipulations are made for the party 
secretaries of the Communist Party committees who oversee the adminis-
trative heads. In the area of education, ethnic minorities are granted privileged 
access to higher education. Nevertheless, patriotic education campaigns are 
carried out and learning Mandarin promoted since kindergarten, while local 
languages and religious education repressed. In Tibet, for instance, the 
Tibetan language is taught only up to middle school. Likewise in Xinjiang, 
freedom of religion is restricted as Uyghurs under the age of eighteen are 
not allowed to attend mosques or receive religious education. In the area 
of media, Beijing enforces strict censorship on reporting ethnic minorities 
tension and discontent (Chou, 2012; Demirtepe and Bozbey, 2012; Hao and 
Liu, 2012; Smith 2009).
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3. China’s United Front Work in Hong Kong
Understanding China’s united front work helps make sense of its policy on 
Hong Kong. Due to the principle of “one country, two systems”, political ac-
quiescence which is secured through carefully designed institutional, political 
and legal means in China is hardly viable in Hong Kong. Moreover, contrary 
to the predominance of state control in China, Hong Kong has a liberal and 
pluralistic political tradition rooted in its long experience with British colo-
nial rule, capitalism and cosmopolitan thoughts. In many ways, China has to 
experiment with its ruling strategies on Hong Kong, not only in proclaiming 
sovereignty after the handover, but also in assimilating and gradually merging 
Hong Kong into the greater Chinese social, cultural and political system. 
During the period before 1997 when China was not the sovereign, the 
concept of united front work had been widely employed to understand the 
informal influence of the formerly Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong (now 
the Central People’s Government Liaison Office, hereafter CPGLO) on Hong 
Kong’s civil society. Since 1997, the CPGLO acts as the representative for 
Beijing, being responsible for liaison between Mainland agencies and the 
local community, coordinating the activities of the CCP in Hong Kong, and 
conducting united front work, propaganda and supervision. It also controls 
Beijing-affiliated publications and media in Hong Kong mobilizing support 
for the policies of the Beijing-appointed government (Yep, 2007). 
The previous examination of China’s united front work in colonial Hong 
Kong tended to focus mostly on how Beijing consolidated its relationship 
with individuals in Hong Kong through cooptation (e.g., Wan, 2003; Lee, 
2006; Lo, 2008; Kwong, 2010). Different from the previous studies, this 
article purports that the united front measures of Beijing in Hong Kong are 
much systematic and adaptive in accord with the “one country, two systems” 
principle and the liberal-pluralist tradition in Hong Kong. As it will be 
analyzed, China’s united front measures in Hong Kong, which include the soft 
tactics of integration, cooptation and collaboration, as well as the hard tactics 
of containment and denunciation, all seek to ultimately consolidate China’s 
hegemony in the local society. 
Integration refers to the process of merging different parties with one 
another based on common interests, and at the ideological and affective 
levels. It indicates not only the development of common instrumental interests 
but also that of common wills and feelings. As a way of neutralizing the 
differences between Hong Kong’s pluralistic society and China and thus 
winning the support of the majority, this measure is widely visible in all walks 
of life in Hong Kong. 
Cooptation describes the process of bringing outsiders (usually the 
resource-poorer) inside (usually the resource-richer) (Saward, 1992). In 
Hong Kong, the Chinese Communist agents actively and selectively recruit 
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and appoint supporters to political institutions and power positions, so that 
alternative views of its supporters can be put in line with those of the Chinese 
authorities. Since the transitional era, cooptation has been conducted via 
appointment to institutions such as the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (hereafter CPPCC), NPC, coopting elites to special bodies such as 
the Basic Law Drafting Committee, and recruitment to political groups such 
as the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong 
(hereafter DAB). 
Compared with cooptation, collaboration indicates a more detached 
relationship between the Communist agents and the political recruits, and 
usually targeting the wavering middle. Though the involved parties willingly 
work together, their cooperation is relatively informal and less institutionalized 
as well as short-term based. In real-life politics in Hong Kong, it is always 
hard to find evidence for the measure of collaboration, largely so because 
of the inconspicuousness of such activities. Collaborators are often those 
who would prefer a little distance from Beijing while not antagonizing it. 
Therefore, they would be keen on keeping their connection with the Chinese 
authorities well away from public gaze. The ultimate aim of collaboration is 
to ensure that the targets do not join force with the opposition, whether or not 
they explicitly support Beijing. 
Containment characterizes particularly the Communist agents’ policy on 
the democratic forces in Hong Kong. Through nourishing supporters’ networks 
and creating strategic alliances with Beijing’s sympathizers, this measure 
aims to check the expansion or influence of democrats. It also involves the 
fragmentation of the opposition camp in order to neutralize its influence. 
Denunciation is the most exclusive form of measure used by the Chinese 
authorities to defeat its enemies, particularly the democrats, and control the 
Hong Kong society. It is characterized by public condemnation and accusation, 
outright rejection, verbal threats, and refusal to communicate. It aims to 
charge someone on their misdeeds, and halt their influence immediately and 
permanently, especially in situations when the authorities perceive that their 
sovereignty is at stake.
Loh and Lai (2007) once stated that China’s united front work in Hong 
Kong has consistently classified the population into three groups: a supportive 
majority to mobilize, a wavering middle to neutralize, and an enemy to defeat. 
The same classification applies to understand how China has accordingly 
treated different political players in post-handover Hong Kong. Integration 
and cooptation are measures for dealing with the majority and supporters, 
collaboration targets the moderate middle, and containment and denunciation 
constrain the influence of enemies to even exclude them. Among all these, 
only denunciation serves a clear purpose of political exclusion. Other 
measures rather involve education, persuasion, threats and inducement.
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3.1. Integration
3.1.1. Integration by economic measures
After more than a decade of returning to Chinese rule, not only has Hong 
Kong operated simultaneously under the Chinese political shade as well 
as British colonial legacy as a special administrative region, and cultivated 
somehow a common understanding that China is the big boss behind; it also 
has become more economically dependent on the sovereign state. After all, 
not only is economic growth and wealth accumulation an essential component 
in China’s struggle to emerge as a world power in the 21st century, it is also 
an effective soft tactic to achieve political control. 
After the political resumption, economic interchange and activities that 
accelerate political assimilation between Hong Kong and China have become 
visible. One notable example is the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA). The CEPA was a bilateral free-trade agreement signed between 
China and Hong Kong in 2003 against the background of both economic 
and political concerns. In 1998, Hong Kong was seriously hit by the Asian 
Financial Crisis. The economic turbulence persisted until 2003 when the Hong 
Kong government was at the same time troubled by the Article 23 fiasco in 
which the proposed national security law was seriously disputed and shelved 
after more than half a million people joined a protest against it. Economic 
measures were then adopted by Beijing to take the edge off the Hong Kong 
government’s legitimacy crisis, which in the years followed have accelerated 
the city’s economic integration and dependence on China.
Although Hong Kong continues to maintain independent trade relations 
with various countries, the significance of China in Hong Kong’s trade 
has become incontrovertible. Regarding inward direct investment, China 
has maintained the largest proportion in 2011 (HK$3,042.8 billion), while 
most of Hong Kong’s outward direct investment also went to the Mainland 
(HK$3,346.4 billion).1 
Ideologically, Beijing, along with the Hong Kong government, claims that 
economic integration is the only way out for Hong Kong under fierce global 
economic competition lest Hong Kong becomes marginalized. For example, 
shortly after the waving of the colonial Hong Kong flag by some protestors 
in a protest in 2012, former Deputy Director of the Hong Kong and Macao 
Affairs Office Chen Zuoer 陈佐洱 alleged that, practically, Hong Kong would 
have become a “dead city” without the assistance from the Mainland China. In 
his words, Hong Kong would be unable to survive without the economic gifts 
and water supply from Guangdong (The Sun 太陽報, 2nd November 2012). 
For one thing, the cultivation of economic integration of Hong Kong and 
China has consolidated the practice of conservatism amongst Hong Kong’s 
business class who, having vested interests in China’s market, would tend 
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not to antagonize the central government. The influx of Chinese capital 
into Hong Kong further engendered conditions for such conservatism. One 
example is the Chinese investment in the local media, which brought about 
apparent changes to the contents of news programs. Asia Television (hereafter 
ATV) is a case in point. Wang Zheng 王征, a major investor of ATV since 
2010, is a CPPCC member and a relative of the former state leader Jiang 
Zemin 江泽民. Though Wang describes himself as a “consultant” to his 
cousin, ATV Executive Director James Shing Pan-yu 盛品儒, he is believed 
to have directly involved in ATV’s day-to-day operations. News reports of 
the ATV have been moving toward a more conservative stance in general. 
For example, in 2012, “ATV Focus” claimed that opponents of the moral 
and national education curriculum in Hong Kong were actually backed by 
London and Washington; and labelled members of the student advocacy 
group Scholarism as naïve teenagers having been manipulated by politicians 
and risking their future by playing with politics (Singtao Daily 星島日報, 
5th September 2012). 
3.1.2. Cultivating patriotism
Cultivating patriotism has constituted much of the ideological reshaping pro-
cess in Hong Kong. Indeed, as the term is subject to multiple interpretations, 
patriotism is a “two-edged sword” for Beijing. Liberal readings of patriotism 
which balances unconditional commitment to state interest with liberal moral-
ity may adversely affect the political order it seeks to establish in Hong Kong. 
Hence, over the years, endeavours have been made to setting hegemonic 
standards for patriotism and branding alternative views in parallel. 
To start with, patriotism in official terms is very narrowly defined. Patriots 
should support the exercise of sovereignty of the central government in Hong 
Kong and fulfil duties stipulated in the Basic Law, such as the obligation to 
protect the national interest of China through legislating laws on national 
security. Though Chinese officials and pro-Beijing figures did not explicitly 
equate “state” with the “party-in-power”, interests of the two are conceived as 
highly intertwined and hence, a patriot must also support Communist rule. 
Politically, patriotism is made a criterion for choosing the Chief Executive 
(hereafter CE) of Hong Kong and the lawmakers. Recently, the patriotism 
debate was rekindled over the heated debate on universal suffrage for 2017, 
as Chinese officials and supporters of Beijing were responding to law 
professor Benny Tai Yiu-ting 戴耀廷’s proposal of calling for 10,000 people 
to blockade Central District in 2014 to put pressure on the central government. 
Yu Zhengsheng 俞正声, member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee 
and Chairman of the CPPCC, claimed that, with the introduction of universal 
suffrage, only those patriotic could be allowed to lead the city (Singtao Daily, 
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7th March 2013). Though commitment to patriotism has never been specified 
in the Basic Law as a prerequisite for candidates running for the CE election, 
it is now made an extra requirement for the future CE. 
Cultural nationalism is also used as a catalyst for integration, with the 
projection of a common ethnic origin, history and interest identified as the 
Chinese nation onto the people of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. In his first 
speech as head of state, Xi Jinping 习近平 asserted that he would fight for 
a great renaissance of the Chinese nation. After his meeting with Honorary 
Chairman of the Kuomintang Lien Chan 連戰 from Taiwan, Xi also described 
compatriots from both sides of the Taiwan Strait as brothers of the same mind, 
who could cooperate in realizing the Chinese dream. Hence, any attempts 
on separating parts from the nation would be deemed immoral. In parallel, 
in Hong Kong, it is noticeable that in recent years, China’s advancements in 
technologies and international status, such as the successful hosting of the 
2008 Olympics, were much publicized to arouse nationalistic sentiment. The 
arrangement of visits of Chinese astronauts and top athletes to Hong Kong 
further indicates such attempts by Beijing. Nationalism is also used to mollify 
and neutralize the tension resulted from rapid and unchallenged integration 
between China and Hong Kong, with the use of family metaphor by the 
officials calling for tolerance on the part of the Hong Kong populace (The 
Standard, 25th February 2013)
While inspiring the people of Hong Kong to pay special attention to 
China by patriotic and nationalist sentiments, their expression of concern 
and sympathy toward political problems in China, especially those related 
to pro-democracy movements and rights-defending activists, are very much 
discouraged. The expression of “well water does not intrude into river water” 
has been persistently used by Chinese officials to analogize the relationships 
between Hong Kong and Mainland China under “one country, two systems”. 
At the same time, identity politics are manipulated through branding certain 
democrats (Wu, 2007). Democrats such as Martin Lee Chu-ming 李柱銘, 
who explicitly called for international attention on China and Hong Kong’s 
human rights condition stirred backlash from Chinese officials and Beijing 
supporters; Lee was virtually accused of being a “traitor” and different from 
the patriotic majority. 
3.2. Cooptation
3.2.1. Giant coopting mechanisms
Previous studies show that cooptation in the local political front can be 
described as a patron-client network (Lo, 2008). Beijing, as a powerful patron 
offers various inducements to solicit and solidify the political loyalty of its 
clients in Hong Kong including the CE, its biggest patron in the city. The 
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CE, being the surrogate of the central government, is entrusted with great 
powers relative to the legislature, whose political loyalty to Beijing is secured 
with the provision of explicit political and economic support. The members 
of the Executive Council, the principal officials, leaders of the pro-Beijing 
political parties such as the DAB are in turn the core clients of the CE. For 
them, inducements may include a considerable degree of power, status, policy 
influence, and so on. 
As the CE is a position of power, it is only natural that Beijing is 
anxious about his/her political loyalty. The Basic Law stipulates that the CE 
shall be accountable to, and be appointed by, the central government. More 
importantly, the right to elect the CE is limited to an electoral college, the 
Election Committee, which consists of 1,200 members from 38 subsectors 
returned by an electorate of around 220,000 individuals and corporations. 
Besides the purpose of political control, the Election Committee is in itself 
a structure for cooptation of selected interests. In a similar vein, the idea 
of functional constituency (hereafter FC)2 in the election of the Legislative 
Council (hereafter LegCo), with its constituencies concentrated in business 
and professional sectors and small electorate, serves the dual purpose 
of containing the democratic influence in the legislature while coopting 
selected interests. Both the Election Committee and FC would ensure that 
the influence of the selected interests prevails in the government. In other 
words, future elections in Hong Kong could not be genuinely democratic 
insofar as FCs not fully abolished and the nomination process of the CE 
firmly controlled by Beijing. 
In addition to the above coopting mechanisms in Hong Kong, the NPC 
and CPPCC are the coopting mechanisms at the state level. In 2013, a broader 
group of representatives from Hong Kong has been named to the twelfth 
CPPCC National Committee than in previous years. Apart from prestigious 
tycoons, professionals and community leaders, these bodies are also coopting 
FC lawmakers and retired high officials in Hong Kong. For instance, Jeffery 
Lam Kin-fung 林健鋒, who was elected to the Commercial (First) FC without 
competition and also a member of the Executive Council, is one amongst the 
124 Hong Kong Deputies to the CPPCC. 
Such ceremonial gift is also bestowed on former CE Tung Chee-hwa 董
建華 who was first elected the Vice-chairman of the CPPCC in 2005, two 
days after his resignation due to “health problems”; and re-elected in 2013. 
Henry Tang Ying-yen 唐英年, who lost the race in the 2012 CE election, was 
among the 299 newly elected Standing Committee members of the CPPCC. 
The former CEs were joined by former officials to be coopted into the 
CPPCC, including ex-Police Commissioner Tang King-shing 鄧竟成 and ex-
Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Timothy 
Tong Hin-ming 湯顯明.
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3.2.2. Cooptation of social bodies and the media
As a way to cultivate comradeship and identification with China as well 
as a supportive following, the CPGLO arranges potential cooptees to visit 
China. For example, in 2007, to rally support for Donald Tsang 曾蔭權 in 
the CE election, and to build consensus between Beijing and Hong Kong’s 
civic associations on the matter, the CPGLO arranged various social and 
professional bodies to meet with Chinese officials. Moreover, starting from 
2007, the CPGLO has also arranged potential cooptees to attend a course 
on national studies jointly offered by national level academies, such as the 
National Academy of Administration (Wen Wei Po 文匯報, 4th November 
2011). Other times, potential allies are invited not only to visit China but also 
to meet with Chinese officials, participate in the national day celebrations, 
and attend high level conferences and meetings. Occasionally, targets are also 
invited to visit their native hometowns to arouse patriotic sentiments and to 
explore investment opportunities. 
In addition to the more specific and important cooptees, secondary school 
and university students are also arranged to visit the Mainland, which serves 
the purpose of arousing their sense of cultural affinity to China while at the 
same time witnessing China’s national achievements. Very often, the exchange 
tours are accompanied by at least one official from the CPGLO, and received 
by Mainland officials at various ranks, depending on the size and nature of 
participants (Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報, 8th August 2009). 
As the coordinator of united front work in Hong Kong, the CPGLO 
collaborates with civic bodies in Hong Kong or sponsors them in organizing 
youth activities and education projects that serve both practical and strategic 
purposes. For example, with its aim of catching up with the favourable 
opportunities created by Hong Kong’s economic integration with China, 
the Federation of the New Territories Youth’s brand-building event, “9+2” 
exchange tour (refers to the nine provinces and two special administrative 
regions in the Pan-Pearl River Delta Regional Cooperation) in 2009 was 
advised by the New Territories Division of the CPGLO. 
Civic bodies that openly declare themselves patriotic and having frequent 
exchanges with Mainland China are likely to have regular contact with the 
CGPLO, especially its Youth Division. Structure of the CPGLO is very 
meticulous allowing officials to specialize in liaising and overseeing particular 
civic bodies (Luk, 2010). Presence of the officials could often be seen in 
major events of these civic bodies, particularly their inauguration and prize 
presentation ceremonies. Officials’ appearance in these activities would be 
widely reported by the pro-China media in Hong Kong. 
Cooptation also takes the form of political appointment, in which core 
members of political parties and civic groups, as well as community leaders, 
IJCS 4-3 Lam&Lam(2).indd   312 11/22/2013   9:47:23 PM
China’s United Front Work in Civil Society      313
are appointed to various state or party institutions or “people’s organizations” 
(such as the All-China Youth Federation, hereafter ACYF) at both national and 
local levels. For instance, the DAB, as flagship for pro-Beijing forces in Hong 
Kong, has most of its core members coopted into the aforementioned bodies. 
Currently, nine members of the DAB are serving as Hong Kong Deputies to 
the NPC, while 32 of them are delegates to the CPPCC. Some of the DAB’s 
younger members, such as Horace Cheung Kwok-kwan 張國鈞, legislators 
Ben Chan Han-pan 陳恆鑌 and Gary Chan Hak-kan 陳克勤, are appointed to 
the ACYF. In its Standing Committee (Session 2011-2013), three members, 
including Chairman Tam Yiu-chung 譚耀宗, Chairman of Senate Yu Sun-say 
and Vice-chairlady Ann Chiang Lai-wan 蔣麗芸, are appointed to the National 
Committee of the CPPCC. Three of its members are coopted to CPPCC at 
sub-national levels; they include Vice-chairman Horace Cheung Kwok-kwan, 
General Secretary Pang Cheung-wai and Treasurer Wong Kine-Yuen. 
Apart from political parties, media owner is another front of cooptation. 
It is observed that after these media owners were granted medals of honour 
and made CPPCC delegates, the papers have turned into strong critics of 
the democrats (Ma, 2007). A case in point is the Oriental Daily. In the early 
years when the newspaper was founded by Ma Sik-chun 馬惜珍 and his 
brother Ma Sik-yu 馬惜如, it was deemed pro-Taiwan, mainly because of 
the owners’ cordial relationship with Kuomintang. Since the handover, the 
newspaper has moved toward a more pro-Beijing stance. Apart from keeping 
itself from reporting negative news in China, the Oriental Daily also fiercely 
and consistently attacks members of the democratic camp, especially Martin 
Lee Chu-ming, Anson Chan Fang On-sang 陳方安生 and its major media 
competitor Jimmy Lai Chee-ying 黎智英. In 2003, Chairman of its Broad of 
Director, Ma Ching-kwan 馬澄坤, was appointed to the National Committee 
of the CPPCC. Ma is also closely associated with the pro-China circle in Hong 
Kong. Recently, Lew Mon-hung 劉夢熊, an outspoken pro-China figure in 
Hong Kong who was a former ally of CE Leung Chun-ying 梁振英, revealed 
in an interview that he put together Ma Ching-kwan and Leung so that Ma 
could help Leung in launching a media war against his competitors in the CE 
election (Ming Pao 明報, 26th January 2013). 
3.3. Collaboration
3.3.1. Pragmatic collaborations in elections
Owing to the partial direct election elements in the LegCo and the District 
Council, Beijing is cautious building collaboration in the elections and 
containing the popularity of the opposite camp in Hong Kong. It has been an 
open secret that the CPGLO has been coordinating different pro-Beijing forces 
IJCS 4-3 Lam&Lam(2).indd   313 11/22/2013   9:47:23 PM
314      Wai-man Lam and Kay Chi-yan Lam 
and candidates in previous legislative and district elections, and mobilizing 
community support for them (Poon, 2008; Lo, 2010). The main purpose is 
apparently to facilitate their victory in these elections. 
Prominent examples were seen in the elections of the LegCo in 2012. 
Candidates who declared themselves “independent” regarding political 
affiliation had actually worked closely with pro-Beijing organizations and 
received their electoral support. Paul Tse Wai-chun 謝偉俊, who was elected 
to the LegCo through the Tourism FC in 2008, “parachuted” to participate 
in Kowloon East GC election in 2012 as an independent candidate. As 
revealed in an election forum hosted by NOW TV, Tse lacked the slightest 
knowledge of district affairs in Kowloon East, but still miraculously won in 
the election with a very high number of votes. Later in another television 
program, Tse admitted that the CPGLO was actually helping him with the 
election campaign, yet he would not follow its directions blindly. He further 
commented that it is not proper for CPGLO officials to appear too often in 
front of the public, since it may give an impression of Hong Kong undergoing 
“Mainlandization” (RTHK 香港電台, 29th November 2011; On the Record 
香港政府新聞網 – 政府評論, 30th December, 2012).
Another example: it was reported that the Federation of Trade Unions 
(hereafter FTU), a pro-Beijing union in Hong Kong, planned to compete 
for a seat in Kowloon West in 2012. Since Lau Chin-shek 劉千石, founding 
President of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, lost his seat 
in the LegCo election in 2008, his supporters who came from the working 
class would probably vote for another pro-labour candidate. Adding these 
votes to its existing supporters at the district level, the FTU would have a 
fairly high chance of winning. Nonetheless, Priscilla Leung May-fun 梁美
芬, an independent candidate in Kowloon West who was “recommended” 
to the FTU’s members by its chairperson Cheng Yiu-tong 鄭耀棠 in 2008 
LegCo election, also relied on the FTU for voter mobilization. Since the DAB 
had already sent its Vice-chairlady Ann Chiang to bid for a LegCo seat, the 
FTU’s entry would risk Leung’s chance of winning. In the end, the CPGLO 
persuaded the FTU out of the election in Kowloon West (Apple Daily 蘋果
日報, 5th March 2012). 
3.3.2. Constitutional reforms in 2010
Another example of collaboration was between Beijing and the Democratic 
Party over the issue of constitutional reform in 2010. In 2009, the Hong 
Kong government published a consultation document to broaden the 
scope of political participation and elements of democracy for the 2012 
elections. The pro-democratic legislators and the community expressed great 
disappointment with the conservative proposal, which has been attacked as 
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a rehash of the one rejected in 2005. A campaign on “de facto referendum” 
was initiated by the Civic Party and the League of Social Democrats in 
which five legislators from the two parties resigned and then mobilized 
the Hong Kong people to vote them back into the LegCo in the by-election 
and demand for universal suffrage in the nearest future. The Democratic 
Party condemned the consultative proposal for failing to facilitate universal 
suffrage in 2012, yet, breaking off relations with the radical democrats in the 
de facto referendum and its assessment that Beijing would be keen to see a 
breakthrough in the talks over constitutional reform, it opted for deliberation 
with the CPGLO. 
In 2010, 11 local democratic groups formed the Alliance for Universal 
Suffrage (hereafter the Alliance), an umbrella group of moderate democrats 
with Democratic Party at its core. It was reported that the CPGLO have 
arranged members of the Alliance to meet with Beijing; dialogue that had 
been ceased since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident was rehabilitated. To strive 
for “the maximum degree of democracy” for 2012 elections, the Alliance was 
prepared to accept the reservation of FC elections for eight more years, which 
departed from the demands of other democratic parties. It further brought up 
the proposal of “one person, two votes” to reform the FC election in 2012, on 
the condition that the FC must be scrapped in 2020. Former Deputy Director 
of the CPGLO, Li Gang 李刚, also spoke favourably of the Democratic Party, 
said the party was invited because it chose neither to participate in nor support 
the de facto referendum (Ming Pao, 25th May 2010). 
At the early stage of the negotiation, proposal of the Alliance was bluntly 
rejected by the Chinese officials. Nevertheless, realizing that the democratic 
legislators were prepared to vote down a reform package with no substantial 
progress for democratic elements for the 2012 elections, the stance of the 
central government then softened considerably. Three days before the package 
was put to vote in the LegCo, Li Gang met with the representatives from 
the Democratic Party and opened green light for their revised constitutional 
reform proposal. The revised proposal was then successfully passed by LegCo 
with 46 votes out of 60. The Civic Party and League of Social Democrats 
were unable to stop the package from getting passed despite their opposition. 
This has triggered a split in the democratic camp as the Democratic Party 
sided with the Hong Kong government amidst severe public recrimination 
and criticisms. 
In that, the strategy of collaboration not only secured the passage of the 
government-proposed constitutional reform package, it also had the effect 
of divide-and-rule. The moderate democrats’ proposal was given way, yet 
with controversies. The society was deeply divided as some believed that 
the revised proposal did not go far enough towards democratic aspirations 
promised in the Basic Law. The radical democrats were dismissed from any 
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meaningful dialogue with the central government, which not only sharpened 
division between the Democratic Party and its allies, but also risked future 
cooperation. Some of the Democratic Party’s supporters were also alienated, 
accusing the party of reneging on its commitments and “selling out” people 
of Hong Kong. 
3.4. Containment
3.4.1. Reinterpretation of the Basic Law
As previously analyzed, state corporatist regimes can make use of the law 
to constitute new state control. In Hong Kong, owing to the judiciary’s 
respectable status and the tradition of the rule of law, containment measure 
has taken place at the constitutional level whereby attempts were made by 
the NPCSC to reinterpret certain stipulations and legal concepts in the Basic 
Law and the Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal’s (hereafter CFA) rulings. 
Containment works in a way that definitions of concepts and practices 
under the Basic Law in Hong Kong would be made in line with Beijing’s 
understanding and judgments, affecting the autonomy of Hong Kong, its 
judiciary independence and democratic development. 
Altogether, the NPCSC had made four attempts to interpret the Basic 
Law. Of relevance here, the second reinterpretation of the Basic Law by 
the NPCSC took place in 2004. After the massive demonstration against the 
Article 23 in 2003, there have been immense demands for universal suffrage 
for the election of the CE and the LegCo in 2007 and 2008. Amidst the 
controversies, the NPCSC took steps to reinterpret Article 7 of Annex I and 
Article III of Annex II of the Basic Law, and made decisions on issues related 
to the methods for selecting the CE in 2007 and for forming the LegCo in 
2008. The NPCSC’s statements ruled out the possibility of implementing 
universal suffrage for the elections of the CE in 2007 and the LegCo in 2008. 
In addition, it declared that any constitutional reforms in Hong Kong have 
to be gradual and orderly, and added a new procedural requirement on the 
democratization of Hong Kong’s electoral system. The LegCo is barred from 
initiating reforms on the election law and, instead, the reform process can 
only be initiated by the CE and requires endorsement by the NPCSC. These 
requirements, however, are not found in the text of the Basic Law.3 
3.4.2. Redefining universal suffrage
The meaning of universal suffrage has become much controversial in the 
course of the debate on Hong Kong’s constitutional development. Under-
standably, China has attempted to restrict the prevalence of the understanding 
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of the concept as equal and universal voting rights as upheld by the democrats 
by redefining the concept as something with Chinese characteristics. Early 
in 2008, former Deputy Secretariat of NPCSC, Qiao Xiaoyang 乔晓阳, who 
has been in charge of Hong Kong’s constitutional reform, together with some 
Chinese legal experts claimed that the meaning of universal suffrage, a term 
having a universal definition under the United Nations’ Covenant, should be 
understood by studying the legislative intent of the Basic Law. This view was 
echoed by Hong Kong’s former Chief Secretary Henry Tang who said the 
Basic Law does not require for the abolition of the FC seats of the LegCo, 
implying that the FC could be retained for universal suffrage. 
In 2010, Qiao Xiaoyang outlined in his speech the future and the 
definition of universal suffrage in Hong Kong. He claimed that “universal 
suffrage” for the legislature means equal and universal voting rights but 
these rights could be subject to legal restrictions. Future elections should be 
compatible with Hong Kong’s legal status, executive-led system and capitalist 
economy as well as the interests of various classes. Qiao’s speech is evident 
that under China’s policy on Hong Kong, the understanding of universal 
suffrage could be modified according to political needs.
In a similar manner, Yu Zhengsheng, member of the CCP Politburo 
Standing Committee and Chairman of the CPPCC, in 2013, claimed that 
Hong Kong must be governed by people who love the country and Hong 
Kong, and warned against the city being used as a subversive base that would 
threaten national security. His view was echoed by Chan Wing-kee 陳永棋, 
a Standing Committee member of the CPPCC, who further suggested that 
in the election of the Hong Kong Chief Executive in 2017 (even if universal 
suffrage would be in place), a screening process or a primary poll should be 
introduced to ensure that the candidates would be acceptable to Beijing, and 
such arrangements are not undemocratic (South China Morning Post, 25th 
March 2013). 
3.4.3.  Demoralizing the democratic camp and reinforcing counter    
 participation
As part of the attempts to contain the influence of the democrats in Hong 
Kong, Beijing has sought to demoralize and spilt the democratic camp. As 
analyzed above, the negotiations on the constitutional reforms for 2012 
between the Chinese authorities and the Democratic Party in 2010 has deeply 
hurt the unity of the democratic camp. Another important example is the 
District Council elections in 2011 in which suspicious vote-rigging in the 
elections back-dropped the landslide victory of the pro-Beijing camp. Also, 
smear campaigns were launched to affect the election results. Near the polling 
date, Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, a local pro-democracy businessman, was reported 
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to have donated a large sum of money to local democratic parties and Cardinal 
Joseph Zen 陳日君, then head of the Hong Kong Catholic Church and an 
active supporter of the democratic movement. Though these donations were 
legal, Lai was accused of being a conduit for foreign money and influence 
(Wall Street Journal, 5th December 2011). 
Attempts to cultivate regimented participation have also been noticeable 
in Hong Kong. While there is no concrete proof of the systematic mobilization 
of the Chinese authorities in the incidents analyzed below, it would also be 
counter-intuitive not to associate them together. By and large, the incidents 
were mobilized by pro-Beijing figures and organizations in Hong Kong 
to dilute the influence of the democrats on issues considered potentially 
subversive and harmful to stability. For instance, on the day of the massive 
demonstration against Article 23 in 2003, a carnival to promote health 
consciousness against SARS was held by the FTU in the same public 
park where the protesters gathered. In 2010, in response to the call for 
“referendum” by the Civic Party and the League of Social Democrats, 96 
leading pro-establishment figures in Hong Kong formed the Alliance for 
Constitutional Development. They declared their support for the government 
proposal on political reforms that had been criticized by democrats as 
conservative. Since 2012, activities both for and against the CE Leung Chun-
ying have become organized. For instance, on 1st January 2013, protests 
both for and against the CE Leung were held. Anti-Leung protest organizers 
claimed 130,000 people had participated in their protest, and the pro-Leung 
protestors were said to be paid for their attendance.
Alongside the above development is the establishment of a significant 
number of pro-Beijing “parallel” and new associations. Assuming the 
pseudo-role of “elite associations”, these parallel associations are formed 
with the purpose to dilute any undesirable political influence and to achieve 
dominance in specific sectors as far as possible. This is another salient 
feature of China’s united front work in Hong Kong, which has been in place 
even before 1997. These associations can either be umbrella or second-
tier organizations affiliated or subordinated to the umbrella organizations. 
While some of these organizations have been established before the political 
handover, some others were founded during the past decade for nourishing 
local support, cultivating patriotism, and counteracting the influence of 
pro-democracy organizations. For instance, the Hong Kong Federation of 
Education Workers was formed in 1975 to balance the influence of the Hong 
Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (1973) which is pro-democracy. Parallel 
to the Hong Kong Federation of Students (1958), which is the umbrella 
association of the student unions of tertiary education institutions who has 
heavily involved in pro-democracy political issues, the Hong Kong Youth 
and Tertiary Students Association was established in 1993 to unite pro-
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establishment tertiary and university students. Near that time, the Hong Kong 
United Youth Association (1992), Hong Kong Youths Unified Association 
(1996), and Federation of New Territories Youth (1997), all with a pro-
Beijing background, were also founded to rally support from the youngsters. 
In the media sector, the Hong Kong Federation of Journalists (1996) was 
formed to counter-balance the influence of the pro-democracy Hong Kong 
Journalists Association (1968). 
Since the political handover and notably after 2003, Beijing has also 
been active in supporting new groups of the second generation of local 
tycoons. Important examples include Y. Elites Group (2007) and Centum 
Charitas Foundation (2008) (Cheung, 2012: 336-338). There has also been 
a proliferation of pro-Beijing new associations targeting particularly the 
younger generations in Hong Kong. These include, for example, the Hong 
Kong Youth Power Association (2001), Future Star Federation of Students 
(2005), and various youth exchange promotion associations with different 
Mainland regions, such as the Hong Kong Youth Exchange Promotion United 
Association (2009).
3.5. Denunciation
In some cases, measures of denunciation were employed by the Chinese 
authorities for asserting forceful and quick political control. One notable 
example is the debate on the de facto referendum initiated by the Civic Party 
and the League of Social Democrats in 2010. The parties’ announcement of 
referendum had precipitated severe criticisms from the Chinese authorities. 
The CPGLO in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office 
denounced such a campaign as violating the spirit and provisions of the Basic 
Law, with particular emphasized that constitutional development in Hong 
Kong be carried out in gradual progress. Referendum, as reiterated by the 
Chinese authorities, carries a special constitutional meaning, and no provisions 
of the Basic Law have empowered Hong Kong to carry out any form of 
referendum. During the course of debate, potential dangers and uncertainties 
were exaggerated by the authorities to delegitimize the movement as a whole. 
For instance, the term “uprising” used by the democrats was framed by the 
authorities as subversive, connoting military uprising. The fight for universal 
suffrage was branded as attempts to seek political independence from China. 
At the societal level, the referendum was further boycotted by pro-Beijing 
elites. The pro-Beijing media staged vehement criticisms of the political 
parties participating in the referendum. Originally, pro-Beijing parties such 
as the DAB and the FTU announced their intention to send candidates for the 
by-election. Nevertheless, their stance changed later on, proclaiming that they 
were against any attempts of confrontational tactics. 
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Another important example is the autonomy movement emerged in 
Hong Kong since 2012. At present, the autonomy movement is hardly “a” 
movement. In terms of the background of people involved, it consists of 
individuals from different social strata and different social bodies such as the 
Hong Konger Front and the Hong Kong City-State Autonomy Movement. 
The goals and demands of the participants and social bodies are also varied, 
ranging from very crude demand that Mainlanders “get lost” from Hong Kong 
to relatively organized ideas about enhancing autonomy for Hong Kong. If it 
were not because of the movement’s anti-Communist sentiments, its general 
call for Hong Kong autonomy, and the waving of the colonial Hong Kong 
flag by some protestors during protests and public forums, prominent Chinese 
officials would not have reacted so sharply. 
Despite the common belief in Hong Kong that “Hong Kong indepen-
dence” is no more than an empty slogan, the development of the movement in 
2012 has invoked sharp criticisms from Chinese officials formerly in charge 
of Hong Kong affairs. Chen Zuoer, for example, said that the rise of a pro-
independence force in Hong Kong is spreading like a virus and should be 
firmly dealt with. Lu Ping 鲁平, in different occasions, denounced that those 
who advocate for Hong Kong independence are morons who do not know 
their history, that Hong Kong would become a dead city without support 
from China, and that those who do not recognize their Chinese identity 
should look at what is written on their passports or renounce altogether their 
Chinese nationality. Such views were echoed by pro-Beijing figures in Hong 
Kong such as former CPPCC member Lew Mon-hung who said that waving 
colonial flag is traitor behaviour and should be banned (Oriental Daily, 2nd 
January 2013).
In a similar manner, in an article published in 2013, Director of Publicity 
at the CPGLO Hao Tiechuan 郝铁川 commented that Hong Kong is at a 
low ebb yet the advocacy for Hong Kong independence is a “poison” which 
also violates the principle of “one country”. Hao, a controversial figure, once 
openly criticized the HKUPOP polls on the development of Hong Kong 
people’s ethnic identification led by Robert Chung 鍾庭耀 as unscientific and 
illogical. His controversial criticism had triggered, or was linked to, series 
of vicious attacks on Chung in the pro-Beijing newspapers in Hong Kong 
and China afterwards. Chung was denounced as inciting Hong Kong people 
to deny their Chinese identity, accepting dirty political bribes, and having 
connection with a British intelligence agency (i-cable, 29th December 2011). 
The incidents eventually prompted Hong Kong’s Secretary for Constitutional 
and Mainland Affairs Raymond Tam 譚志源 to deny interference from Beijing 
on the polls and reassured that academic freedom in Hong Kong is protected 
by the Basic Law.
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4. Lessons from Hong Kong
China’s united front work in Hong Kong illustrates a more inclusionary 
version of state corporatism adopted for political expediency considera-
tion. The above analysis shows that the strategies it employs range from 
subtle to blatant moves, from soft to hard measures, and from assimilation 
to total rejection. 
It is noticeable that, as political expedient and soft tactics, namely 
integration, cooptation and collaboration, have been employed by Beijing in 
Hong Kong inasmuch as in other autonomous regions, other ruling strategies, 
namely containment and denunciation, adopted in Hong Kong are not very 
commonly used in other autonomous regions where political coercion and 
heavy-handed assimilation policies might instead be perceived as more 
effective in curbing enemies. Classical theories of united front work of the 
Chinese Communist Party suggest that the scope of attack be restrained, and 
the number of enemies be kept to the minimal. The same principle applies to 
Hong Kong. From the way how Beijing antagonized the Democratic Party to 
how it beckoned its past enemy, it seems that its united front work in Hong 
Kong is to a large extent, pragmatic and versatile. Nevertheless, China’s use 
of collaboration as a delaying strategy, notably on universal suffrage, has 
alienated even moderate democrats, which has made China’s united front 
work on the 2017 and 2018 constitutional reforms even more difficult. By 
far, the democrats have formed a new alliance for universal suffrage which 
can be considered as a counter united front. Indeed, China’s measures of 
soft tactics as well as containment and denunciation, being used in parallel, 
have polarized the local civil society which would run counter to Beijing’s 
desires in its united front work. While part of the Hong Kong population are 
increasingly dependent on the central government for benefits and political 
decisions, the increasing sense of alienation of some others has provoked 
separatism and radical reaction much stronger than ever. 
Alongside this, Beijing has actively involved in the local civil society 
by establishing parallel organizations, manipulating elections and organizing 
political activities to counteract popular participation. This has resulted in the 
further politicization and polarization of the civil society. In recent years, it is 
witnessed that the antipathy to state intervention in Hong Kong has spilled, 
fuelling general anger of local people towards Mainlanders and elevating to 
new heights conflicts between local groups who hold different views of China. 
As also noticed in other autonomous regions, Beijing’s assimilatory policy, 
dedicated to cultivate state patriotism and dilute local identity of ethnic mi-
norities, has transformed the tension between the state and the ethnic minority 
groups into clashes between the Chinese and the ethnic minority groups or 
clashes between different ethnic groups (Demirtepe and Bozbey, 2012).
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Ultimately, in the framework of state corporatism, China’s united front 
work will hardly be effective in achieving the Chinese ideal of social harmony, 
if, without a genuine respect for multiculturalism. The support of minority 
cultures, and a different cultural system such as that of Hong Kong, by the 
Chinese government has been utilized as a symbol of the state’s endorsement 
of multiculturalism, the format and content of cultural diversity are however 
regulated. Ethnic minorities are included in official discourses in the contexts 
of “national unity” and “development”: It is only within this overarching 
framework of national unity that ethnic minorities have been permitted to 
seek state recognition of their self-defined identity. They are also presented 
as groups in need of economic development. Believing that economic well-
being may ease discontents amongst ethnic groups, Beijing presents itself as 
a benevolent patron, which unavoidably confines the groups’ developmental 
choices to the ones formulated by the state. A similar mentality has been 
exhibited in Beijing’s interaction with the civil society in Hong Kong, with 
an emphasis on Hong Kong as an economic city and the state as an important 
source of support and inspiration. While such cultural diversity is built 
upon hierarchies and formulated from top-down, united front unavoidably 
alienates and suppresses important aspects of ethnic and native cultures, and 
precludes other possibilities of development wanted by the locals from being 
actualized. 
5. Conclusion
This article unravels China’s united front work in the civil society of Hong 
Kong after the political handover since 1997. Using the case of Hong Kong, it 
aims to investigate China’s direct and indirect influence in managing the local 
civil society through five types of corporatist measures, including integration, 
cooptation, collaboration, containment, and denunciation. While it has been 
widely analyzed by scholars that state corporatism characterizes the state-
society relations in China, including the state’s relations with its autonomous 
regions, the case of Hong Kong, however, shows that the ruling strategies of 
China are very adaptive and tend to be inclusionary. 
The strategies analyzed above range from subtle to blatant moves, and 
from soft to hard tactics. They reflect a host of attitudes and aims of the 
central government in dealing with the local community, which run from 
assimilation to total rejection. The adoption of different strategies depends 
upon whether the central government regards its targets as friends, valuable 
potential cooptees or enemies. Nevertheless, because of Hong Kong’s unique 
situation, China’s strategies in this special administrative region appear to be 
more inclusionary than they are in the Mainland. The soft and hard tactics 
used in parallel in Hong Kong have resulted in further politicization and 
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polarization of the civil society, and transformed the tension between the 
state and the local groups into clashes between different local groups, as seen 
in other autonomous regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Over the years, the 
agents for state corporatism have been ever expanding in Hong Kong. The 
ideologies propagated have now gone beyond consensus and harmony to 
also include patriotism and reinterpretation of other political ideas, including 
universal suffrage, conducive to cultivating obedience.
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1.  “External Direct Investment Statistics of Hong Kong 2011”. <http://www.
statistics.gov.hk/pub/B10400032011AN11B0100.pdf>
2.  As of 2013, the Hong Kong LegCo is composed of 70 seats. Half of the seats are 
returned by five geographical constituencies (GC) of around 3.4 million registered 
voters on universal suffrage, and the other 30 members by 28 FCs of around 
230,000 registered voters. The remaining five members are nominated by elected 
District Councillors, and elected by all registered voters who do not have a right 
to vote in FC elections. FC’s eligible voters include designated individuals and 
legal entities such as organizations and corporations, representing predominantly 
business and professional interests. Over the decades, the non-uniform election 
methods within the FC, the unfair nature of their representation, and the 
institutionalized constraints FC placed on limiting the power and mitigating the 
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influence of the GC-returned legislators have attracted lots of criticisms and 
demands for their abolition.
3.  <http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/publications/book/15anniversary_reunification_
ch2_3.pdf>
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